Competencia Monopolística en Bebidas: Marcas y Oligopolio - Prof. anónimo, Ejercicios de Administración de Empresas

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Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. 1 of 38 12.1 Monopolistic Competition 12.2 Oligopoly 12.3 Price Competition 12.4 Competition versus Collusion: The Prisoners’ Dilemma 12.5 Implications of the Prisoners’ Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing 12.6 Cartels C H A P T E R 12 Prepared by: Fernando Quijano, Illustrator Competència Monopolística i Oligopoli CHAPTER OUTLINE 2 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. ● Competència monopolística Mercat on les empreses poden entrar lliurement I on produeixen la seva marca o producte diferenciat. ● Oligopoli Mercat on només unes poques empreses competeixen les unes amb les altres I l’entrada de noves empreses és obstaculitzada. ● Cartel Mercat on algunes o totes les empreses col·ludeixen, coordinant preus i nivells de producció per maximitzar beneficis. 5 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. Equilibri en el llarg termini de l’empresa en competència monopolística In the long run, these profits attract new firms with competing brands. The firm’s market share falls, and its demand curve shifts downward. In long-run equilibrium, described in part (b), price equals average cost, so the firm earns zero profit even though it has monopoly power. 6 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. COMPARACIÓ AMB LA SITUACIÓ DE COMPETÈNCIA PERFECTA Under perfect competition, price equals marginal cost. The demand curve facing the firm is horizontal, so the zero-profit point occurs at the point of minimum average cost. Competència monopolística i eficiència econòmica 7 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. COMPARACIÓ COMPETÈNCIA PERFECTA VS COMPETÈNCIA MONOPOLÍSTICA Under monopolistic competition, price exceeds marginal cost. Thus there is a deadweight loss, as shown by the yellow- shaded area. The demand curve is downward-sloping, so the zero profit point is to the left of the point of minimum average cost. En els dos mercats es produeixen entrades d’empreses fins que els beneficis esdevenen 0. 10 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. En els mercats oligopolístics, els productes poden ser o no diferenciats. El que importa és que només unes poques empreses produeixen la major part o la totalitat de la producció. En alguns mercats oligopolístics, algunes o totes les empreses obtenen beneficis substancials a llarg termini. A causa de les barreres d'entrada es fa que sigui difícil o impossible que noves empreses entrin. L'oligopoli és una forma freqüent de l'estructura del mercat. Exemples d'indústries oligopolístiques inclouen automòbils, acer, alumini, petroquímica, equips elèctrics i ordinadors. Les economies d'escala poden fer que no sigui rendible que més d'unes poques empreses coexisteixin en el mercat; patents o l'accés a una tecnologia poden excloure els competidors potencials; i la necessitat de gastar diners per al reconeixement de la marca i mantenir la reputació pot descoratjar l'entrada de noves empreses. Aquestes són les barreres d'entrada "naturals" (són les de caràcter estructural del mercat oligopolista) Addicionalment, les empreses establertes poden prendre accions estratègiques per dissuadir l'entrada. La gestió d'una empresa oligopolística és complicada perquè la fixació de preus, la producció, les decisions de la publicitat i d'inversió impliquen importants consideracions estratègiques, que poden ser de gran complexitat. Oligopoly 11 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. Equilibri en un mercat oligopolista En un mercat oligopòlic una empresa fixa el preu o producció basats en part en consideracions estratègiques sobre el comportament dels seus competidors. Amb algunes modificacions, el principi bàsic per descriure un equilibri quan les empreses adopten decisions prenent explícitament el comportament dels altres en compte, és el mateix que en l'equilibri en els mercats competitius i monopolístics: Quan un mercat està en equilibri, les empreses estan fent el millor que poden i no hi ha raó per canviar el seu preu o de sortida. ● Equilibri de Nash Conjunt d’estratègies o accions en les quals cada firma fa el millor que pot ateses les accions dels seus competidors. ● Duopoli Mercat en el qual dues empreses competeixen una amb l’altra. 12 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. FIRM 1’S OUTPUT DECISION FIGURE 12.3 Model de Cournot ● Cournot model Oligopoly model in which firms produce a homogeneous good, each firm treats the output of its competitors as fixed, and all firms decide simultaneously how much to produce. Firm 1’s profit-maximizing output depends on how much it thinks that Firm 2 will produce. If it thinks Firm 2 will produce nothing, its demand curve, labeled D1(0), is the market demand curve. The corresponding marginal revenue curve, labeled MR1(0), intersects Firm 1’s marginal cost curve MC1 at an output of 50 units. If Firm 1 thinks that Firm 2 will produce 50 units, its demand curve, D1(50), is shifted to the left by this amount. Profit maximization now implies an output of 25 units. Finally, if Firm 1 thinks that Firm 2 will produce 75 units, Firm 1 will produce only 12.5 units. 5 75 15 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. The Linear Demand Curve—An Example Two identical firms face the following market demand curve Also, Total revenue for firm 1: then Setting MR1 = 0 (the firm’s marginal cost) and solving for Q1, we find Firm 1’s reaction curve: By the same calculation, Firm 2’s reaction curve: Cournot equilibrium: Total quantity produced: 𝑃=30−𝑄•   MC1=MC2=0•   𝑅1=𝑃𝑄1=(30−𝑄 )𝑄1=30𝑄1−𝑄1 2−𝑄2𝑄1•   MR1=∆𝑅1   /∆𝑄1=30−2𝑄1−𝑄2•   𝑄1=15− 1 2 𝑄2 •   𝑄2=15− 1 2 𝑄2 •   𝑄1=𝑄2=10•   𝑄=𝑄1+𝑄2=20•   If the two firms collude, then the total profit-maximizing quantity is: Total revenue for the two firms: R = PQ = (30 –Q)Q = 30Q – Q2, then MR1 = ∆R/∆Q = 30 – 2Q Setting MR = 0 (the firm’s marginal cost) we find that total profit is maximized at Q = 15. Then, Q1 + Q2 = 15 is the collusion curve. If the firms agree to share profits equally, each will produce half of the total output: 𝑄1=𝑄2=7.5•   (12.1) (12.2) 16 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. DUOPOLY EXAMPLE FIGURE 12.5 The demand curve is P = 30 − Q, and both firms have zero marginal cost. In Cournot equilibrium, each firm produces 10. The collusion curve shows combinations of Q1 and Q2 that maximize total profits. If the firms collude and share profits equally, each will produce 7.5. Also shown is the competitive equilibrium, in which price equals marginal cost and profit is zero. 17 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. First Mover Advantage—The Stackelberg Model ● Stackelberg model Oligopoly model in which one firm sets its output before other firms do. Suppose Firm 1 sets its output first and then Firm 2, after observing Firm 1’s output, makes its output decision. In setting output, Firm 1 must therefore consider how Firm 2 will react. P = 30 – Q Also, MC1 = MC2 = 0 Firm 2’s reaction curve: Firm 1’s revenue: Setting MR1 = 0 gives Q1 = 15, and Q2 = 7.5 We conclude that Firm 1 produces twice as much as Firm 2 and makes twice as much profit. Going first gives Firm 1 an advantage. 𝑄2=15− 1 2 𝑄1 •   𝑅1=𝑃𝑄1=30𝑄1−𝑄1 2−𝑄2𝑄1•   𝑅1=30𝑄1−𝑄1 2−𝑄1(15− 12𝑄1)=15𝑄1− 1 2 𝑄1 2•   𝑀𝑅1=∆𝑅1/∆𝑄1=15−𝑄1•   (12.2) (12.3) (12.4) 20 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN PRICES FIGURE 12.6 Here two firms sell a differentiated product, and each firm’s demand depends both on its own price and on its competitor’s price. The two firms choose their prices at the same time, each taking its competitor’s price as given. Firm 1’s reaction curve gives its profit- maximizing price as a function of the price that Firm 2 sets, and similarly for Firm 2. The Nash equilibrium is at the intersection of the two reaction curves: When each firm charges a price of $4, it is doing the best it can given its competitor’s price and has no incentive to change price. Also shown is the collusive equilibrium: If the firms cooperatively set price, they will choose $6. The firms have the same costs, so they will charge the same price P. Total profit is given by πT T = πT 1 + πT 2 = 24P – 4P2 + 2P2 − 40 = 24P − 2P2 − 40. This is maximized when πT T/P = 0. πT T/P = 24 − 4P, so the joint profit-maximizing price is P = $6. Each firm’s profit is therefore πT 1 = πT 2 = 12P − P2 - 20 = 72 − 36 − 20 = $16 21 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. EXAMPLE 12.2 A PRICING PROBLEM FOR PROCTER & GAMBLE P&G’s demand curve for monthly sales: Assuming that P&G’s competitors face the same demand conditions, with what price should you enter the market, and how much profit should you expect to earn? TABLE 12.2 P&G’S PROFIT (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS PER MONTH) COMPETITOR’S (EQUAL) PRICES ($) P& G’s Price ($) 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.10 –226 –215 –204 –194 –183 –174 –165 –155 1.20 –106 –89 –73 –58 –43 –28 –15 –2 1.30 –56 –37 –19 2 15 31 47 62 1.40 –44 –25 –6 12 29 46 62 78 1.50 –52 –32 –15 3 20 34 52 68 1.60 –70 –51 –34 –18 –1 14 30 44 1.70 –93 –76 –59 –44 –28 –13 1 15 1.80 –118 –102 –87 –72 –57 –44 –30 –17 𝑄=3375𝑃−3.5 (𝑃𝑈 ) .25 (𝑃𝐾 ) .25•   $1.40 is the price at which your competitors are doing the best they can, so it is a Nash equilibrium. As the table shows, in this equilibrium you and your competitors each make a profit of $12,000 per month. If you could collude with your competitors, you could make a larger profit. You would all agree to charge $1.50, and each of you would earn $20,000. 22 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. Competition versus Collusion: The Prisoners’ Dilemma 12.4 In our example, there are two firms, each of which has fixed costs of $20 and zero variable costs. They face the same demand curves: Firm 1’s demand: Firm 2’s demand: We found that in Nash equilibrium each firm will charge a price of $4 and earn a profit of $12, whereas if the firms collude, they will charge a price of $6 and earn a profit of $16. So if Firm 1 charges $6 and Firm 2 charges only $4, Firm 2’s profit will increase to $20. And it will do so at the expense of Firm 1’s profit, which will fall to $4. 1 1 2 12 2Q P P   2 2 1 12 2Q P P   2 2 2 20 (4)[(12 (2)(4) 6] 20 $20P Q        1 1 1 20 (6)[12 (2)(6) 4] 20 $4PQ        TABLE 12.3 PAYOFF MATRIX FOR PRICING GAME FIRM 2 CHARGE $4 CHARGE $6 Firm 1 Charge $4 $12, $12 $20, $4 Charge $6 $4, $20 $16, $16 ● payoff matrix Table showing profit (or payoff) to each firm given its decision and the decision of its competitor. ● noncooperative game Game in which negotiation and enforcement of binding contracts are not possible. PAYOFF MATRIX 25 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. Implicacions del dilema del presoner en l’Oligopoli Preus rígids ● preus rígids Característica dels mercats oligopolistes per la qual les firmes són reticents a canviar els preus encara que els costos o la demanda canviï. ● corba de demanda doblegada Model oligopolista en el qual cada firma fa front a una demanda doblegada, al preu actual. A preu més alts la demanda és molt elàstica I a preus més baixos és inelàstica. La repetició permet a les firmes desenvolupar reputació de la qual confiança en pot sorgir. Coordinació oligopolista pot sorgir en la definició de preus. 26 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. CORVA DE DEMANDA DOBLEGADA Each firm believes that if it raises its price above the current price P*, none of its competitors will follow suit, so it will lose most of its sales. Each firm also believes that if it lowers price, everyone will follow suit, and its sales will increase only to the extent that market demand increases. As a result, the firm’s demand curve D is kinked at price P*, and its marginal revenue curve MR is discontinuous at that point. If marginal cost increases from MC to MC’, the firm will still produce the same output level Q* and charge the same price P*. 27 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. Senyals de preus i preu líder ● Senyalització de preus Forma de col·lusió implícita en la qual una firma anuncia un increment del preu i espera que les altres firmes la segueixin ● Preu líder Una firma líder marca el preu I la resta la segueixen. En algunes indústries, una empresa gran pot emergir de forma natural com a líder. Les altres empreses decideixen que estan millor igualant els preus del líder, en lloc de tractar de soscavar el líder. El lideratge de preus també pot servir com una manera perquè les empreses oligopòliques facin front a la reticència a canviar els preus, una reticència que sorgeix de la por a perdre vendes. 30 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. PRICE SETTING BY A DOMINANT FIRM Model de la firma dominant ● Firma dominant Firma gran amb un gran percentatge de les vendes defineix el preu per maximitzar beneficis, tenint en compte la oferta que faran les firmes petites. The dominant firm sets price, and the other firms sell all they want at that price. The dominant firm’s demand curve, DD, is the difference between market demand D and the supply of fringe firms SF . The dominant firm produces a quantity QD at the point where its marginal revenue MRD is equal to its marginal cost MCD. The corresponding price is P*. At this price, fringe firms sell QF so that total sales equal QT. 31 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. Cartels Els productors en un càrtel convenen expressament a cooperar en l'establiment dels preus i els nivells de producció. Si suficients productors s'adhereixin als acords del càrtel, i si la demanda del mercat és prou inelàstica, el cartell pot fixar preus molt per sobre dels nivells competitius. Els cartells són sovint internacionals. Mentre que als Estats Units les lleis antimonopoli prohibeixen a les companyies nord-americanes de conspirar, en d'altres països són molt més febles i estan a vegades mal executades. Per exemple, el cartel de l'OPEP és un acord internacional entre els països productors de petroli que ha tingut èxit en l'augment dels preus mundials del petroli per sobre dels nivells competitius. 32 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. Primer: els membres del cartel han d’estar d’acord en el preu i la producció I s’han d’adherir a aquest acord. Segon: La demanda ha de ser prou inelàstica. Si no tindrà poc poder de monopoli. CONDICIONS PER A L’ÈXIT DEL CARTEL ANALISIS DE LA FIXACIÓ DE PREUS EN EL CARTEL La fixació de preus en un Cartel pot ser analitzada utilitzant el model de firma dominant discutit anteriorment. Aplicarem el model a dos cartels, al de la OPEP i al cartel del coure CIPEC. Ens ajudarà a entendre perquè el de la OPEP ha estat exitós en elevar els preus i el de CIPEC No. 35 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. • Els exemples de l'OPEP i CIPEC permeten il·lustrar que la cartelització reeixida requereix de dues coses: • En primer lloc, la demanda total per al bé no ha de ser molt elàstica al preu. • En segon lloc, el cartel ha de controlar gairebé tota l'oferta mundial o, si no, l'oferta dels productors que no són al cartel no ha de ser elàstica al preu. • La majoria dels cartels internacionals de productes bàsics han fracassat perquè en pocs mercats mundials es reuneixin les dues condicions. 36 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. EXAMPLE 12.6 THE CARTELIZATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS Intercollegiate athletics is a big—and an extremely profitable—industry. Like any industry, intercollegiate athletics has firms and consumers. The “firms” are the universities that support and finance teams. The inputs to production are the coaches, student athletes, and capital in the form of stadiums and playing fields. The consumers are the fans and the TV and radio networks. There are many firms and consumers, which suggests that the industry is competitive. But the persistently high level of profits in this industry is inconsistent with competition. This profitability is the result of monopoly power, obtained via cartelization. The cartel organization is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA restricts competition in a number of important ways. To reduce bargaining power by student athletes, the NCAA creates and enforces rules regarding eligibility and terms of compensation. To reduce competition by universities, it limits the number of games that can be played each season and the number of teams that can participate in each division. And to limit price competition, the NCAA positioned itself as the sole negotiator of all football television contracts. 37 of 38Copyright © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e. EXAMPLE 12.6 THE CARTELIZATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS In 1984, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA’s monopolization of football television contracts was illegal, allowing individual universities to negotiate their own contracts. The ensuing competition led to an increase in the amount of college football shown on television, but a drop in the contract fees paid to schools. The NCAA still negotiates fees for other televised collegiate sports; in 2010, CBS and Turner Broadcasting signed a $10.8 billion deal with the NCAA to cover the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship for 14 years. The NCAA’s anticompetitive practices have come under numerous attacks. In 2005, the National Invitation Tournament (NIT), a college basketball tournament operated by the Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Committee, challenged the NCAA’s rule that effectively forced schools invited to its tournament to boycott the NIT. In 2007, the NCAA was sued by 11,500 Division I football and basketball players claiming that it illegally fixed the price of an athletic scholarship below the cost of a college education. According to the players, the NCAA shortchanged them, on average, $2,500 a year because of its arbitrary limit on scholarships.